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INTRODUCTION

The existence and viability of collective bargaining as an institutionalized force in the private sector of the United States is
beyond question. Its impact upon labor markets, industry, and the
economy has been staggering. This importance has resulted in part
from congressional support in the form of the Wagner Act 1 and the
Taft-Hartley Act, 2 both of which expressed a strong national policy
of promoting the peaceful settlement of industrial disputes by subjecting labor-management controversies to the mediatory influence of
negotiation. 3
At the same time, the essential mechanisms involved in collective bargaining do violence to just as fundamental a national policy:
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1 National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976).
2 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 171-187 (1976).
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 171, 174; see id. §9 141, 151, 158(d). The Taft-Hartley Act declared it to be
the policy of the United States that . . . sound and stable industrial peace and the
advancement of the general welfare, health and safety of the Nation and of the best
interests of employers and employees can most satisfactorily be secured by the settlement of issues between employers and employees through the processes of conference and collective bargaining between employers and the representatives of
their employees.
Id. § 171. Employers, employees, and their representatives were enjoined to "exert every
reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, hours, and working
conditions." Id. § 174(1).
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encouragement of competition. 4 The basic organizational weapons of
labor unions involved activities which, if engaged in by business entities, would violate the antitrust laws. However, recognizing that
labor could obtain comparable bargaining power with management
only if permitted to organize, Congress provided an exemption from
the antitrust laws for certain specific trade union activities including
strikes, pickets, and boycotts, regardless of their impact upon competition. 5 Although this statutory exemption does not itself apply to
collective bargaining agreements, the United States Supreme Court
eventually acknowledged that in order for the collective bargaining
process to be effective the resulting agreement must also be granted
some immunity from antitrust regulation. 6 Accordingly, the Supreme Court recognized that a proper acco mmodation must be
reached between the competing congressional policies favoring collective bargaining on the one hand and competition on the other. 7 The
Supreme Court's attempts to reconcile these two opposing national
policies have resulted in conferring upon collective bargaining agreements a limited, but ill-defined non-statutory exemption. The uncertainties of the non-statutory exemption have created a number of
problems for business, labor and the judiciary. This Comment will
explore these problems through a discussion of the development, application and limitations of both the statutory and non-statutory labor
exemptions from the antitrust laws. 8
THE STATUTORY EXEMPTION

Although it is debatable whether Congress intended the Sherman
Act to apply to labor union activity, 9 employers succeeded in utilizing
4 This policy has been clearly expressed through the federal antitrust statutes. See, e.g.,
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §9 12-27 (1976) & 29 U.S.C. 9

52-53 (1976); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976).
5 See notes 9-23 infra and accompanying text.
6 See, e.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975).
7 Id. (citing Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965)).
8 For a comprehensive discussion of this entire area, see Roberts & Powers, Defining the
Relationship Between Antitrust Law and Labor Law: ProfessionalSports and the Current Legal
Battleground, 19 WM. & MARY L.J. 395 (1978).
9 The Sherman Act provided: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal .... 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). It also provided that "[e]very
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.... Id. § 2.
For a comprehensive discussion of the Sherman Act and the congressional intent behind it,
see E. BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN ACT 11-54 (1930). See also F. FRANKFURTER &
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the antitrust laws to attack the struggling trade union movement at
the turn of the century.' 0 In Loewe v. Lawlor," sometimes known
as the Danbury Hatters case, a hat manufacturer instituted a treble
damage action against the officers and members of the hatters union
alleging that the union's initiation of a nationwide secondary boycott
against the hat company constituted an illegal restraint of trade.12 The
United States Supreme Court indicated that unions were indeed vulnerable to such actions under the Sherman Act since the Act "provided that 'every' contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of
14
trade was illegal." 'a This literal interpretation of the Sherman Act
threatened the very existence of trade unions15 whose avowed purpose was to eliminate competition in the labor market.
Understandably, the trade union movement responsed with an
intensive lobbying effort for passage of the Clayton Act 16 in 1914,
which was designed in part to immunize unions from the sweep of
the antitrust laws. Two provisions of the Act were intended to accomplish this purpose: one section declared that "[t]he labor of a
human being is not a commodity or article of commerce," and consequently the antitrust laws should not be construed to forbid labor
organizations from carrying out their legitimate objects,' 7 and another

N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 5-17 (1930); Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition:

The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14, 30-32 (1963).
1o During the first seven years of the Sherman Act's existence, the period from 1890 to
1897, the federal courts invoked the statute 12 times against labor unions and only once against
business groups. E. BERMAN, supra note 9, at 3.
11 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
12Id. at 304-06. The complaint thereby alleged a violation of Section One of the Sherman
Act, quoted in note.9 supra. See 208 U.S. at 304-09.
13 208 U.S. at 301; see note 8 supra. The Court noted that attempts within the Congress to
exempt labor organizations from the proscriptions of the Act had failed. 208 U.S. at 301.
14 Chief Justice Fuller, speaking for the Court, stated that the Sherman Act made no distinctions among classes of contracts or combinations and applied to labor organizations as well as
to any other combination in restraint of trade. 208 U.S. at 301-02.
15 See P. TAFT, ORGANIZED LABOR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 216-18 (1964).

1a Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976) & 29 U.S.C.
§§ 52, 53 (1976)).
17 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976). The section provided in full:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes
of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or
restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the
legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be
held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade,
under the antitrust laws.
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section limited the use of federal injunctions by management in labor
disputes. 18
Despite the broad language and seemingly clear intent of the
Clayton Act, in a series of cases the Supreme Court persisted in narrowly defining the "legitimate objects" of trade unions and thereby
authorized antitrust suits against unions that pursued goals or utilized
means, deemed unlawful, such as nationwide secondary boycotts.1 9
Again the labor unions sought legislative relief, which was obtained in
the form of the Norris-La Guardia Act of 1932.20 This act directed
the courts to give a more expansive reading to the term "labor dispute," which was defined to include "any controversy concerning
terms or conditions of employment . . . regardless of whether or not
the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and
employee." 2 1 Moreover, it deprived the federal courts of the juris22
diction to issue injunctions in most labor disputes.
Is

29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976). This section provided in pertinent part:
No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the United
States, or a judge or the judges thereof, in any case . . . involving, or growing out
of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment, unless necessary to
prevent irreparable injury to property, or to a property right, of the party making
the application, for which injury there is no adequate remedy at law ...
And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person or persons, whether singly or in concert, from terminating any relation of employment, or
from ceasing to perform any work or labor, or from recommending, advising, or
persuading others by peaceful means so to do; or from attending at any place where
any such person or persons may lawfully be, for the purpose of peacefully obtaining
or communicating information, or from peacefully persuading any person to work or
to abstain from working; or from ceasing to patronize or to employ any party to such
dispute, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful and
lawful means so to do; . . . or from peaceably assembling in a lawful manner, and
for lawful purposes; or from doing any act or thing which might lawfully be done in
the absence of such dispute by any party thereto; nor shall any of the acts specified
in this paragraph be considered or held to be violations of any law of the United
States.

Id.
19 See, e.g., Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 433, 465-72 (1921) (limiting Clayton
Act's immunity to immediate employees of embattled employer); Bedford Cut Stone Co. v.
Journeyman Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37, 47, 54-55 (1927) (restraint of trade will not be
condoned if other less intrusive alternatives are available). In Deering, the Supreme Court
reasoned that the legislature had "assum[ed] the normal objects of a labor organization to be
legitimate.'" 254 U.S. at 469. The Clayton Act therefore extended protection to labor organizations only when "lawfully carrying out their legitimate objects," id. (emphasis in original), but
not when actually engaging in a conspiracy in restraint of trade. Id. The Court concluded that
the Clayton Act could not be interpreted "as authorizing any activity otherwise unlawful, or
enabling a normally lawful organization to become a cloak for an illegal combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade as defined by the anti-trust laws." Id.
20 Ch. 90, §§ 1-15, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976)).
2' 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1976).
22 Id. §§ 104-05. These sections of the Norris-La Guardia Act provided in pertinent part:
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In construing the Norris-La Guardia Act, the Supreme Court has
recognized a broad, statutory exemption for labor unions, although
limiting the scope of that statutory immunity to those situations in
which the union acts unilaterally in its own self-interest and not in
combination with a non-labor group. 23 When unions act within these
limitations, their essential activities-strikes, picketing, and
boycotts-enjoy absolute statutory immunity from the antitrust laws.
Paradoxically, this congressional grant of immunity does not extend to
the product and goal of successful union activity: the collective bargaining agreement. The sole protection available in regard to the collective bargaining agreement is derived solely from the judicially
extrapolated non-statutory exemption.
THE NON-STATUTORY EXEMPTION

The non-statutory exemption springs from Congress' strong expression of support in the Norris-La Guardia Act 24 and the Wagner
Act 25 for the collective bargaining process and for judicial restraint in
labor controversies. Its contours have developed from an accommodaNo court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of
any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in
such dispute ... from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following
acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of
employment;
(b) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization or of any
employer organization...
(d) By all lawful means aiding any person participating or interested in any
labor dispute who is being proceeded against in, or is prosecuting, any action or
suit in any court of the United States or of any State;
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor
dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not
involving fraud or violence;
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their
interests in a labor dispute...
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue a restraining order
or temporary or permanent injunction upon the ground that any of the persons
participating or interested in a labor dispute constitute or are engaged in an unlawful combination or conspiracy because of the doing in concert of the act enumerated. . ..
Id.; see F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 9, at 200.
23 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231-37 (1941).
24 See notes 20-22 supra and accompanying text.
25 See generally Keyserling, The Wagner Act: Its Origin and Current Significance, 29 CEO.
WASH. L. REv. 199 (1960).
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tion made by the courts between Congress' conflicting preferences for
collective bargaining and a competitive marketplace. 2 6 Therefore
agreements between employers and unions which produce market restraints are carefully scrutinized by the cdurts. Such agreements gain
immunity under the non-statutory exemption in far more limited situations than do unilateral actions of unions under the statutory exemp27
tion.
The limitation upon the scope of the statutory exemption that the
union must have acted in its own self-interest has been applied to the
non-statutory exemption as well. 28 However, the Supreme Court
imposed additional limitations in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3,
IBEW, 2 9 a case involving a union charged with conspiring with
employers who manufactured electrical equipment to secure a price
fixing arrangement in the New York City area. 3 0 The union participated in the scheme by mounting an aggressive campaign to obtain
closed shop agreements with all manufacturers and contractors in the
area, under which agreements the contractors were obligated to
purchase equipment only from those manufacturers who also had
closed shop agreements with the union. 3 ' Although the union was
doubtless motivated by its own self-interest, 32 the Court held that the
employer could not invoke the aid of the union in its attempt to establish a sheltered market. 33 The Court ruled that when a union and
employer conspire to violate the antitrust laws through a collective
34
bargaining agreement, both forfeit any right to the labor exemption.
Two decades later the Supreme Court had the opportunity to
review the scope of the labor exemption in the context of more subtle
forms of anticompetitive behavior. In the first of two companion
cases, United Mine Workers v. Pennington,35 the union was charged
with antitrust violations by a small independent coal producer premised upon an industry-wide agreement entered into between the

26 See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 806 (1945).

27 E.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 623, 625 (1975).
28 Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 808 (1945).
29 Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
30 Id. at 798-800.
31

Id.

32

Id. at 799. The union clearly desired to increase union membership and wages and to

expand employment opportunities for its members. Id.
33 Id. at 809. After all, "'ifbusiness groups, by combining with labor unions, can fix prices
and divide up markets, it was little more than a futile gesture for Congress to prohibit price
fixing by business groups themselves." Id. at 810.
34Id. at 809-10.
35 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
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union and the large coal producers to substantially increase wages. 36
It was claimed that this amounted to a conspiracy to destroy the
smaller, less efficient coal operators who could not afford to pay the
uniform wage scale. 3 7 Consistent with its earlier decision in Allen
Bradley Co., the Court held that if the allegations were proven the
labor exemption would not apply since "[o]ne group of employers
may not conspire to eliminate competitors from the industry and the
union is liable with the employers if it becomes a party to the
conspiracy." 38 Furthermore, the Court held that "a union forfeits its
exemption from the antitrust laws when it is clearly shown that it has
agreed with one set of employers to impose a certain wage scale on
other bargaining units." 39 Thus, a union and the employer act at
their own peril if, as part of a collective bargaining agreement, the
union restricts its discretion in future negotiations outside the bargaining unit. A union may legitimately pursue a policy of bargaining
for uniform industry-wide wage rates, unless the strategy of the union
is suggestive of collusion and conspiracy with the employer. The
Court further stated that it was "beyond question that a union may
conclude a wage agreement with the multi-employer bargaining unit
without violating the antitrust laws and that it may as a matter of its
own policy, and not by agreement with all or part of the employers of
40
that unit, seek the same wages from other employers."
On the other hand, in Pennington's companion case, Local 189,
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co. ,41 the collective bargain36 Id. at 659-60.
37 Id. at 663.
38 Id. at 665-66.

39 Id. at 665.
40 Id. at 664; see NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87, 94-96 (1957). Justice
White, speaking for the Court, emphasized that, although wages are a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining, limits existed as "to what a union or an employer may offer or extract in
'the name of wages, and because they must bargain does not mean that the agreement reached
may disregard other laws." 381 U.S. at 665.

In concurring -opinion, Justice Douglas agreed that if, for the purpose of forcing some
employers out of business, an industry-wide collective bargaining agreement established a wage
scale exceeding the financial capabilities of some operators, then both the union and the conspiring employers would be guilty of violating the antitrust laws. Id. at 672-73 (Douglas, J.,
concurring). In addition, Justice Douglas argued that "[a]n industry-wide agreement containing
those features is prima facie evidence of a violation," id. at 673, and noted:
It is elementary that an unlawful conspiracy may be and often is formed without
simultaneous action or agreement on the part of the conspirators. . . . Acceptance
by competitors, without previous agreement, of an invitation to participate in a

plan, the necessary consequence of which, if carried out, is restraint of interstate
commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman Act.
Id. at 673 (quoting Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939)) (citations
omitted).
41 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
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ing agreement under attack was held exempt from the antitrust
laws. 4 2 The controversy arose when, in the course of negotiating a
new contract, the union rejected proposals by a multi-employer group
that it eliminate the existing contract restrictions on market operating
hours. 4 3 At the final bargaining session, most of the employers
agreed to sign a contract retaining the provision. 4" Jewel Tea, however, signed the agreement only under the threat of a strike. 45 Jewel
Tea then brought an action against the union alleging that the marketing hours restriction was an illegal restraint on trade accomplished by
the union's combining with a non-labor party, one of the other
employers.46
Although holding that the labor exemption did apply, the Supreme Court did not agree upon a rationale for the decision. 4 7 Justice White stated that the coverage of the antitrust laws had to be
accommodated to the national labor policy. 48 Noting that bargaining
in the areas of wages, hours, and working conditions was mandatory,
Justice White indicated that "this fact weigh[ed] heavily in favor of
antitrust exemption for agreements on these subjects." 4 9 However,
he emphasized that in the absence of an actual conspiracy between
union and employer, "[t]he crucial determinant is not the form of the
agreement-e.g., prices or wages-but its relative impact on the
product market and the interests of union members." 50 Justice
White believed that the particular hours of the day in which
employees were required to work was a mandatory subject of bargaining between employers and unions. 5 ' Furthermore, "although the
effect on competition [was] apparent and real, . . . the concern of
union members [was] immediate and direct." 52 Weighing their re42 Id. at 688 (White, J., announcing judgment of Court).
"4 Id. at 680. The existing contract restricted working hours to "9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.
Monday through Saturday, inclusive," and also restricted market operating hours by providing
that "[n]o customer shall be served who comes into the market before or after the hours set
forth above." Id. at 679-80.
44 Id. at 680.
45 Id. at 681.
46

Id.

41 Justice White, who wrote the opinion of the Court in Pennington, announced the judg-

ment of the Court and delivered an opinion which was joined in by the Chief Justice and
Justice Brennan. Justice Goldberg, with whom Justices Harlan and Stewart joined, wrote an
opinion concurring in the judgement in Jewel Tea, and dissenting from the opinion and concurring in the reversal in Pennington. Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black and Clark, dissented in Jewel Tea.
4' 381 U.S. at 689 (White, J.).
49 Id.
50 Id. at 690 n.5.
5' Id. at 691.
52 Id.
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spective interests, Justice White concluded that "the national labor
policy expressed in the National Labor Relations Act places beyond
the reach of the Sherman Act union-employer agreements on when,
as well as how long, employees must work." 53 Thus, when the
union's primary concern is so immediate and direct as to form an
intimate relationship with the national policy in favor of collective
bargaining, and the market restraint, although real, is not an immediate naked restraint, the non-statutory exemption from the antitrust laws will protect the agreement.
Justice Goldberg, on the other hand, contended that any collective bargaining agreement pertaining to mandatory subjects of bargaining was absolutely exempt from antitrust attack. 54 He believed
that Justice White's balancing approach failed "to give full effect to
congressional action designed to prohibit judicial intervention via the
antitrust route in legitimate collective bargaining." 55
Although the Pennington and Jewel Tea decisions demonstrated
that the dimensions of the labor exemption had changed, they did
little to specify the precise nature of the new perimeters. Lower
courts were directed in appropriate cases to balance Congress' broad
policy in favor of collective bargaining with its equally strong policy in
favor of competition. However, the courts were provided scant guidance in determining the point at which the labor policies became
"immediate and direct" or market restrictions rose above being
merely "apparent and real." It has been argued that the underlying
conflict between the Sherman Act and the legislation favoring collective bargaining "is so irreconcilable that, apart from entirely subordinating one to the other, the regulatory distinctions employed must
be largely arbitrary-there are no general principles by which these
56
policies can be harmonized."
The confusion engendered by Pennington and Jewel Tea was
heightened by the fact that the Court had split into three different
groups, each composed of three members, and each supporting a different opinion. 5 7 Accordingly, the Supreme Court sought to take ad53 Id.
54 Id. at 710 (Goldberg, J., concurring in the judgment).
55 Id. at 697. Justice Douglas, on the other hand, would have denied the utilization of the
labor exemption on the ground that there had been an illegal union-employer conspiracy to
restrain trade. Id. at 737 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
56 See Winter, supra note 9, at 16-17.
57 See note 47 supra and accompanying text. Moreover, the Court's next opportunity to
resolve these numerous ambiguities, American Federation of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99
(1968), proved unproductive. The Court did not adopt either Justice White's or Justice
Goldberg's position, but merely held that the dispute involved two labor organizations, rather
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vantage of the opportunity to reconcile its views in a later case, Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local 100.58 This case arose from
the efforts of a building trade union to organize the mechanical subcontractors in the Dallas area. 5 9 The union's primary tactic was to
picket general contractors in an effort to compel them to agree to deal
only with subcontractors who were parties to the union's current collective bargaining agreement. 60 The union did not seek to represent
the employees of the general contractors. 6 1 Connell Construction
Co. reluctantly capitulated to the union pressure and signed the subcontracting agreement. Shortly thereafter, Connell instituted suit
seeking a declaration that the agreement was an illegal restraint on
62
competition.
The Court held that the union's activities were outside the labor
63
exemption. Justice Powell, speaking for a majority of the Court,
attempted to clarify the opinions in Pennington and Jewel Tea, and in
the process greatly extended the implications of those decisions. The
Court found that the union's subcontracting agreement with Connell
was a direct restraint on competition because it excluded some subcontractors from the market simply because they were non-union.6
Due to the methods employed in pursuit of their legitimate union
goal, the union was not entitled to the labor exemption since "1labor
policy clearly does not require . . . that a union have freedom to
impose direct restraints on competition among those who employ its
members." 65 The Court was of the opinion that in the face of mar-

than a conspiracy with a non-labor group, and thus the controversy fell firmly within the
Hutcheson labor exemption. Id. at 105-07.
58 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
59 Id. at 618-19.
60 Id.

61 Id. at 619.
62 Id. at 620-21. However, it should be noted that Connell Construction Co. did not allege
an unlawful conspiracy. Id. at 625 n.2.
63 Justice Powell was joined in his opinion by Chief Justice Burger and by Justices White,
Blackmun, and Rehnquist. Justice Douglas and Justice Stewart, who was joined by Justices
Douglas, Brennan and Marshall, filed dissenting opinions.
64 421 U.S. at 623. Moreover, the Court stated:
This kind of direct restraint on the business market has substantial anticompetitive
effects, both actual and potential, that would not follow naturally from the elimination of competition over wages and working conditions. It contravenes antitrust
policies to a degree not justified by congressional labor policy, and therefore cannot
claim a non-statutory exemption from the antitrust laws.
Id. at 625.
65 Id. at 622.
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ket restraints whose nature offended the fundamental policies of the
Sherman Act, the national labor policies carried little weight in view
of the fact that the union had no interest in organizing the employees
of the contractor whom they picketed. 66 The Court did not address
the question of whether a more immediate and direct interest, such
as the existence of a collective bargaining relationship between the
67
parties, would have changed the results.
When Connell is read in light of the prior decisions it embraced,
an outline of the scope of the labor exemption may be seen. In regard
to labor negotiations which result in a union-employer agreement, the
courts have developed definite criteria by which to determine the
applicability of the labor exemption. First, the exemption is inapplicable unless a bona fide union seeks to employ the agreement in
furtherance of the union's self-interest. Second, even when the union
is acting in its self-interest, it may not combine with non-labor groups
in a conspiracy to impose market restraints. Third, the labor exemption does not apply when a union restricts its discretion in future
negotiations outside the bargaining unit. Fourth, when a union pursues its own self-interest by entering into an agreement with a nonlabor party in an alleged restraint of trade, it becomes necessary to
weigh the relevant competing policy considerations inherent in the
Sherman Act and the Wagner Act. Jewel Tea suggest that the Court
will tip the scales in favor of labor in. a case in which the national
labor policy interests are strong and the antitrust ramifications are
comparatively weak. 68 On the other hand, Connell demonstrates
that the Court will have no hesitation in withholding the labor
exemption when the effect on the national labor policy is minimal
while, due to the existence of a direct restraint on competition, the
antitrust considerations loom large. 6 9 Figure 1 summarizes the application of these criteria.

66 Id. at 626.

67 The National Labor Relations Board and several courts have concluded that market restraints, similar to those which existed in Connell, are entitled to an antitrust exemption if a
collective bargaining relationship exists between the signatories of the collective bargaining
agreement. See, California Dump Truck Owners Ass'n Inc. v. Associated Gen. Contractors, San
Diego Chapter, 562 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1977), Bullard Contracting Corp. v. Laborers Local 91,
__
F. Supp.
- (W.D.N.Y. 1979), 100 L.R.R.M. 2951; Carpenters Local No. 94 v. Woelke
& Romero Framing, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. No. 40 (1978).
68 See text accompanying notes 41-55 supra.
69 See text accompanying notes 58-66 supra.
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Figure 1
THE LABOR EXEMPTION

CONCLUSION

Two of Congress' fundamental policies-the advancement of
labor-management harmony and free competition-frequently come
into conflict with each other. In order to resolve this difficult quandary the United States Supreme Court has utilized two types of labor
exemptions to antitrust law: statutory and non-statutory. Although the
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statutory exemption absolutely immunizes the major weapons of
union activity, strikes, pickets, and boycotts, it does not protect the
results of these strategies: the collective bargaining agreement. The
statutory exemption applies only to situations involving unilateral
union activity, and not to instances in which a union joins with a
non-labor party in a negotiated contract that creates market restraints.
Realizing the inability of such a system to adequately protect the
national labor policy of encouraging collective bargaining, the Supreme Court has recognized a limited non-statutory exemption for
collective bargaining agreements, provided certain requirements are
met: (1) the agreement was the end result of bona fide negotiations;
(2) the agreement was not a part of a union-employer conspiracy to
restrain trade; and (3) the agreement did not restrict the union in its
bargaining with third parties. If all of these threshold requirements
are satisfied, the conflicting national policies of labor and competition
are then balanced to determine whether application of the labor
exemption is appropriate.
Unfortunately, the Court has not indicated how it would resolve
a controversy involving both strong labor and strong antitrust policy
considerations. Until such a dispute is resolved by the Supreme
Court, the full extent and scope of the non-statutory antitrust labor
exemption will remain in doubt.

